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NOTES
THE HUMANITARIAN RULE-A POSITION
OF PERIL DOCTRINE
The Missouri court, setting forth the constitutive facts of a
cause of action under the humanitarian doctrine, has denomi-
nated the position of peril as the chief factor of liability.1 The
peril of the injured party has been described as "the real foun-
dation upon which the structure of this doctrine rests,"2 for the
basic principle of the humanitarian doctrine is that, after plain-
tiff has come into a position of peril, defendant by the use of
due care could have avoided injuring him.3 Where the danger
zone4 commences is a question for the jury under the facts and
circumstances of the case if there is a reasonable doubt. The
court, however, has been so frequently plagued with the problem
of determining the pleading, proof and instruction which should
govern the jury in ascertaining the existence of a position of
peril that one may well wonder at the optimism of the St. Louis
Court of Appeals when it stated:
This opinion [referring to Banks v. Moiriso] is such a
masterful and succinct statement of the doctrine of the hu-
manitarian rule as applied in this state that the bench and
bar will have little difficulty hereafter in understanding
what is necessary in pleading, proof, and instruction in this
class of cases.7
The best known attempt at a general definition of the position
of peril or, as it is often called, the position of imminent peril8
1. Banks v. Morris (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482, 484.
2. State ex rel. Vulgamott v. Trimble (1923) 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W. 1014,
1019.
3. Alexander v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. (1931) 327 Mo. 1012, 38 S. W. (2d)
1023, 1026; Bumgardner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. (1937) 340 Mo. 521,
102 S. W. (2d) 594, 597.
4. The terms "position of peril" and "danger zone" are used interchange-
ably. Keele v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. (1914) 258 Mo. 62, 167 S. W. 433,
438; State ex rel. Himmelsbach v. Becker (1935) 337 Mo. 341, 85 S. W.
(2d) 420, 423. See Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1934)
20 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 113, 122.
5. Kloeckener v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. (1932) 331 Mo. 396, 53 S. W.
(2d) 1043, 1044; Homan v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1933) 334 Mo. 61, 64 S.
W. (2d) 617, 623.
6. (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482.
7. Wilsch v. Gleiforst (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 850, 852.
8. It is unnecessary that the words "imminent peril" be defined in the
instructions since they are ordinary English words. Bryant v. Kansas City
Rys. (1921) 286 Mo. 342, 228 S. W. 472, 474. In Nagle v. Alberter (Mo.
App. 1932) 53 S. W. (2d) 289, 293, the court said that if defendant desired
a more specific instruction, he should have asked for it.
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is that of White, J., who said, "Peril would be imminent only
when the ordinary and natural efforts to be expected in such
person would not put him in a place of safety."9 Also frequently
recurring in attempts at definition are the statements that the
word "peril" as used in the humanitarian doctrine means some-
thing more than a bare possibility of an injury occurring, 0 and
that it is "not a contingent danger to a person in peril which
brings into operation the humanitarian rule, but a certain dan-
ger."'" The question to be considered here is what typical fact
situations have been held to have created a position of peril.
The zone of peril when the plaintiff is aware of the approach
of an oncoming vehicle is very narrow, so that, where plaintiff
attempts to take the right of way or "beat it across," the duty
of defendant to act does not begin until plaintiff is actually in
the vehicle's path, or so close to it that it is apparent that he
will not stop before reaching it.12 Thus, in a case involving a
plaintiff who was not oblivious, an instruction authorizing a ver-
dict for plaintiff "if the jury find as said deceased approached
and attempted to cross the tracks he was in a place of imminent
and dangerous peril" was held erroneous as including within the
danger zone the approach to the track. 13 Obliviousness on the
part of plaintiff, however, widens the zone of peril beyond the
path of the moving vehicle. 14 It is for this reason that an instruc-
tion is erroneous which authorizes the jury to find for the de-
fendant if it should find that "plaintiff walked or moved directly
into the path of defendant's said automobile at a time when de-
fendant could not by the exercise of the highest degree of care
avoid striking plaintiff."'1 The cases condemning such an instruc-
tion have involved oblivious plaintiffs and for this reason the
9. Banks v. Morris (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482; Ziegehneier v.
East St. Louis & Suburban Ry. (1932) 330 Mo. 1013, 51 S. W. (2d) 1027,
1029.
10. State ex rel. Vulgamott v. Trimble (1923) 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W.
1014, 1019; Wallace v. St. Joseph Ry., L. H. and P. Co. (1935) 336 Mo. 282,
77 S. W. (2d) 1011, 1013.
11. Stewart v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1925) 308 Mo. 383, 272 S. W. 694,
696; Perry v. Fleming (1927) 221 Mo. App. 1071, 296 S. W. 167, 170.
12. Stanton v. Jones (1933) 332 Mo. 631, 59 S. W. (2d) 648, 654;
Smithers v. Barker (1937) 341 Mo. 1017, 111 S. W. (2d) 47, 52, and cases
there cited.
13. Lamoreux v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. (1935) 337 Mo. 1028, 87 S. W. (2d)
640, 642.
14. Clay v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (Mo. 1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 409, 412;
Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., L. & P. Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 319, 73 S. W. (2d)
205, 208.
15. Martin v. Fehse (1932) 331 Mo. 861, 55 S. W. (2d) 440, 442; Hawken
v. Schwartz (Mo. App. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 877, 880; Prater v. Rausch
(1939) 344 Mo. 888, 129 S. W. (2d) 910, 911.
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court has been opposed to narrowing thus the limits of the posi-
tion of peril.16 However, in Kirkham v. Jenkins Music Co., the
court approved an instruction which authorized a verdict for de-
fendant if the jury found that "plaintiff stepped out of said
safety zone and into the path of defendant's * * * automobile in
such close proximity that defendant could not by the highest
degree of care have avoided striking plaintiff."17 The cases con-
demning similar instructions were distinguished. It was pointed
out that in this case, if plaintiff had continued to walk north,
there would have been no collision, since defendant's car was
also travelling north, and the possibility that she might go west
out of the safety zone was not such certainty of peril as is re-
quired to create a position of peril. In the distinguished cases
there was a certainty of peril even if the vehicles in question con-
tinued in their original courses. 8 In the recent case of Branson
v. Abernathy Furniture Co.,' 9 the court again distinguished the
right-angle-crossing cases, in which the danger zones were wide
because of plaintiff's obliviousness, from cases in which the origi-
nal parallel paths of the moving vehicles do not make collision
inevitable. In this case plaintiff and defendant were driving their
automobiles in opposite directions on a highway when plaintiff's
car skidded to the left so that defendant's car struck it. Since
no collision would have resulted had both parties continued in the
directions they were going and intended to go, the court held that
there was a narrower zone of peril than in the. right-angle-cross-
ing cases.20
Despite this importance in many instances of the fact of obliv-
iousness in the proof of a case under the humanitarian doctrine,
it is not necessary to plead it, even in the absence of helpless
peril.21 Nor is it necessary that an instruction require the jury
to find that plaintiff was oblivious, so long as it requires that
plaintiff be found to have been in a position of peril.22 In Perkins
16. See Burke v. Pappas (1927) 316 Mo. 1235, 293 S. W. 142, 146,
where the court said, "Under the humanitarian doctrine * * * the driver
of an automobile cannot supinely wait until the pedestrian takes the last
step into the direct path of the automobile before acting to avoid injuring
the pedestrian, but his duty to stop the automobile, or warn the pedestrian
of impending danger, we think, arises upon the first appearance of danger."
17. (1937) 340 Mo. 911, 104 S. W. (2d) 234, 235.
18. Id. at 236.
19. (1939) 344 Mo. 1171, 130 S. W. (2d) 562.
20. Id. at 569.
21. Banks v. Morris (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482, 485.
22. Karte v. J. R. Brockman Mfg. Co. (Mo. 1922) 247 S. W. 417, 423;
Wenzel v. Busch (Mo. 1923) 259 S. W. 767, 771; Barnes v. Terminal R. R.
Ass'n (1938) 343 Mo. 589, 122 S. W. (2d) 907.
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v. Terminal Railroad Associkation 3 the court, in a four to three
decision, went even further and approved an instruction which
authorized the jury to determine whether plaintiff was "ap-
proaching" and was "in a position of peril," without requiring a
finding of obliviousness.24 Gannt, J., in whose dissent Frank, J.,
concurred, agreed that obliviousness is not an ultimate fact to
be pleaded under the humanitarian doctrine, where the proof
shows plaintiff was in a position of peril, but felt that it must
be pleaded where plaintiff is only approaching a position of
peril. 2 5 Ellison, J., in a separate dissent, disapproved of the in-
struction altogether.2 6 A year later, the Perkins case, while not
directly overruled, was modified in another en bane decision. 27
Ellison, J., now speaking for a majority of the court, condemned
the use of the word "approaching" as indefinitely extending the
field within which vigilance under the humanitarian doctrine was
to be exacted.'- It has now been settled that it is reversible error
to impose a duty upon a defendant when plaintiff is approach-
ing, entering, or coming into a position of peril.29 This is so even
though the jury is required to find also that the plaintiff was
oblivious to his peril.'0 The court, in State ex rel. Snider v. Shain,
though conceding that obliviousness may extend the zone in
which a situation of peril arises, nevertheless maintained that
the duty of defendant does not begin until the situation of peril
arises . 3  It is doubtful whether, in this particular case, the in-
struction"2 did mislead the jury. It required them to find not only
23. (1937) 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d) 915, 920.
24. See id. at 932, for earlier cases approving such "approaching in-
atructions." State ex rel. Himmelsbach v. Becker (1935) 337 Mo. 341, 85
S. W. (2d) 420, 423.
25. Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n (1937) 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d)
915, 924.
26. Id. at 935.
27. Buehler v. Festus Merc. Co. (1938) 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d)
961. Two judges concurred only in the result.
28. Id. at 970.
29. Kick v. Franklin (1939) 345 Mo. 752, 137 S. W. (2d) 512, 515. The
words "immediately coming into" in the instruction, while severely con-
demned, were not held reversible error in this case because the balance of
the instruction made it clear that no duty was imposed until after the
plaintiff was in imminent peril. See also Hilton v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n.
(1940) 345 Mo. 987, 137 S. W. (2d) 520, 522.
30. State ex rel. Snider v. Shain (1940) 345' Mo. 950, 137 S. W. (2d)
527, 529. See Larey v. Missouri-K. T. R. R. (1933) 333 Mo. 949, 64 S. W.
(2d) 681, 683; State ex rel. Himmelsbach v. Becker (1935) 337 Mo. 341,
85 S. W. (2d) 420, 423; Crews v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. (1937) 341
Mo. 1090, 111 S. W. (2d) 54, 57.
31. (1940) 345 Mo. 950, 137 S. W. (2d) 527, 529.
32. " * * if you further find that at said time and place * ** plaintiff
*** was in or coming into a position of peril of being struck by defendant's
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that defendant ought to have seen plaintiff coming into the path
of his automobile, but also that plaintiff was both actually and
apparently oblivious to any impending danger.
A judge of the Supreme Court of Missouri recently expressed
the belief that the case of Banks v. Morris, 3 which definitely
established the rule that obliviousness is only an evidential fact,
should be overruled.34 In connection with the instruction under
consideration in the Perkins case, he pointed out that it was
illogical not to require an instruction on obliviousness, since it
was obliviousness which made plaintiff's position perilous and
which was, therefore, essential to plaintiff's case .3  Logic equally
demands that, in any case where plaintiff's obliviousness enlarges
the danger zone, the jury be instructed as to it. Although the
court has held that a finding of obliviousness need not be re-
quired by instruction, its decisions show that both a "reasonable
appearance" of obliviousness and actual obliviousness on plain-
tiff's part are necessary to extend the zone of peril. In a recent
case the court said:
It is the reasonable appearance of an intention to immedi-
ately go into the path of an oncoming vehicle without know-
ing of its approach, and actually not knowing, that places
a person in a position of imminent peril from it, while far
enough beyond its path to still be able to stop in time to
avoid it if he knew it2r
automobile * * * and was oblivious of such peril * * and if you further
find that defendant saw, or by the exercise of the highest degree of care
could have seen the plaintiff in or immediately coming into a position of
being struck and injured by defendant's automobile * * and apparently
oblivious of any impending danger."
33. (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482, 485.
34. Ellison, J., dissenting in Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n (1937) 340
Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d) 915, 934.
85. Ibid.
36. Poague v. Kurn (Mo. 1940) 140 S. W. (2d) 13, 19. See also Womack
v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1935) 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S. W. (2d) 368, 371, and
cases there cited. Elkin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 951,
74 S. W. (2d) 600, 603. See Smithers v. Barker (1937) 341 Mo. 1017, 111
S. W. (2d) 47, 52, where the fact situation under consideration is presented
under two headings--"reasonable appearances" and "actual facts."
It should be noted that unusual circumstances, even where plaintiff is
not oblivious, may widen the danger zone. In Bode v. Wells (1929) 322 Mo.
386, 15 S. W. (2d) 335, 337, plaintiff started across a street car track at
the usual stopping place, signalling the motorman to stop by waving an
uplifted umbrella. It was held that the danger zone was not bounded by
the near rail of the track where she was struck because it was easy to see
that she intended to cross the track. This case was distinguished in
McGowan v. Wells (1930) 324 Mo. 652, 24 S. W. (2d) 633, 638, where it
was held that plaintiff did not enter the danger zone until he took the last
step or so before going into the course the street car would take since
plaintiff saw the car coming, walked at an ordinary gait, and did not signal
Washington University Open Scholarship
On a number of occasions the Missouri court has cited section
480 of the Restatemenzt of the Law of Torts37 as authority for
the proposition that it is not enough to allow recovery under
the humanitarian doctrine that plaintiff was oblivious to his
peril in a case establishing a wide zone of peril, but that it must
further appear that plaintiff's obliviousness was sufficiently ap-
parent so that it could have been known in the exercise of -ordi-
nary care2 It should be noted that section 480 of the Restate-
ment is not a statement of the Missouri humanitarian doctrine,
which does not require that defendant knew of plaintiff's situa-
tion.
On the basis of the cases, a recent article on the humanitarian
doctrine, although recognizing that it is not mandatory, advo-
cates requiring an instruction on obliviousness for the reasons
that
(a) it would make clearer to the jury the meaning of immi-
nent peril and why it arises; (b) it would help circumscribe
the arguments made to juries; and (c) it is appearances
reasonably indicating obliviousness of danger that extend
the rule beyond what otherwise would be the last clear
chance zone of peril, * * *.40
Ellison, J., has pointed out that an examination of the Missouri
cases will show that in many instances plaintiffs have from
the car. See Schinogle v. Baughman (Mo. App. 1921) 228 S. W. 897, and
cases there cited (pedestrian aware of approach of vehicle yet unconscious
of his peril).
37. Restatement, Torts (1938) sec. 480; comment b. "When defendant can
assume plaintiff will avoid danger. It is not enough that the defendant
should see the plaintiff in a position which would be dangerous were the
plaintiff not aware of what is going on. The defendant must also realize
or have reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and, therefore, in
peril. The defendant is entitled to assume that the plaintiff is paying or
will pay reasonable attention to his surroundings; until he has reason to
suspect the contrary, he has no reason to believe plaintiff is in any danger.
Therefore, the defendant is liable only if he realizes or has reason to realize
that the plaintiff is inattentive and consequently in peril."
38. Crews v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. (1937) 341 Mo. 1090, 111 S. W.
(2d) 54, 57; Poague v. Kurn (Mo. 1940) 140 S. W. (2d) 13, 18; Camp v.
Kurn (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 772, 775. In Womack v. Missouri Pac.
R. R. (1935) 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S. W. (2d) 368, 371, 372, "reasonable ap-
pearances" were first, plaintiff did not look toward the train, second, the
road was in such a slick, muddy condition that it might reasonably be in-
ferred that the driver's close attention was required to stay on it, and third,
the car continued at the same speed all the way up the incline to the rail-
road track.
39. Trusty, Humanitarian Rule in Missouri (1940) 11 Mo. B. J. 88, 96.
See Trusty, Constructing and Reviewing Instructions (Mo. ed. 1941) 169,
sec. 29.
40. I. e., the extension of the position of peril beyond the zone where
plaintiff could not escape by exercising due care.
NOTES1941]
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choice pleaded, proved, and asked instructions on the theory that
they were oblivious of the peril or unable to extricate them-
selves.41
We have already noted that the position of peril means more
than the bare possibility of an injury occurring-that it is a
certain, not a contingent, danger.4 2 With only this generalized
verbalism as a guide, the court has been called upon to decide
in cases involving fact situations more complicated than ordinary
collision cases whether a position of peril exists. In a leading
case, 3 the plaintiff rode in a freight car, partitioned in the
center, one-half of which contained his horses. A sudden stop-
ping of the train threw one of the horses through the partition
upon the plaintiff. The court conceded that plaintiff was not
in a safe place but held that his position was not so perilous as
to bring him within the humanitarian rule. Again, riding on
the ladder of a rapidly moving freight car was held to be a
dangerous way to travel but not a perilous position within the
meaning of the humanitarian rule. 4
The ease with which one may change the course of an auto-
mobile, as contrasted with a railroad train or street car, has
also given rise to peculiar problems in ascertaining the position
of peril. In one case,45 defendant was driving a truck eastward
while plaintiff was going westward on a motorcycle. When de-
fendant reached a north and south street, he turned left with-
out giving any warning and struck plaintiff. The court held that
plaintiff was not in a position of peril until defendant turned
left. Similarly, where plaintiff pulled out to the left to get by a
taxi-cab standing on the right, and defendant, going in the oppo-
site direction, pulled out from behind an automobile in front of
him and struck plaintiff's car, the court said that plaintiff was
not in a position of peril until defendant's car turned to the left
to pass around the car in front of him.46 These decisions sug-
gest the problem which arises where the facts of the case indi-
41. Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n (1937) 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d)
915, 932.
42. See notes 10 and 11, supra.
43. State ex rel. Vulgamott v- Trimble (1923) 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W.
1014, 1018.
44. Stewart v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1925) 308 Mo. 383, 272 S. W. 694,
695. In this case plaintiff voluntarily jumped off at his destination. The
court said that, even conceding plaintiff was in a position of peril, he would
have been unable to recover. One may doubt whether the same decision
would have been reached had the train been operated so as to put plaintiff
in real danger of being thrown off or of jumping off involuntarily.
45. Phillips v. Henson (1930) 326 Mo. 282, 30 S. W. (2d) 1065, 1067.
46. Dilallo v. Lynch (1936) 340 Mo. 82, 101 S. W. (2d) 7, 10.
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cate that the same negligent act both gave rise to the position
of peril and caused the injury. In several cases the court has
allowed recovery in such a situation. Thus, in Huckleberry v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad ,47 plaintiff was standing near defend-
ant's right of way where there were pools of gasoline from over-
turned tank cars. Defendant's wrecking crew operated the en-
gine so as to cause sparks to ignite the gasoline and burn the
plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff was in a position of peril,
reasoning that, although in the absence of fire plaintiff's position
was safe, in the presence of fire it was extremely perilous.4 In
Bobos v. Krey Packing Co.49 plaintiff was injured because of the
negligent starting of a truck while he was climbing upon it with
his hand on the handrail. The court said:
The position of plaintiff while in the act of climbing onto
the truck, considered with reference to its standing still, or
moving slowly, was no doubt a comparatively safe one, but
with reference to the truck's being "suddenly and violently
started forward" it was extremely perilous. There was
therefore a "present existence" of plaintiff's perilous posi-
tion before the driver started the truck °
Despite these cases, the court, in apparently similar fact situa-
tions, has refused to allow recovery. In Ridge v. Jones,5' plain-
tiff was injured because of the negligent starting of an auto-
mobile, which skidded into him as he stood with his hand on the
door immediately after alighting. The court here ruled that
plaintiff was not in a position of peril until the car started, after
which time nothing could have been done to avert the injury,
and thus the humanitarian doctrine did not apply. The court
distinguished those cases allowing recovery despite the fact that
the negligent act causing the injury also created the peril on
the ground that, in those cases, the plaintiffs were "in immediate
peril if such act was committed-not necessarily perhaps that
injziry was certain to follow the negligent act, but that the peril
was certain and imminent. ' ', 2
Consider the similarity of the fact situations distinguished.
In Bobos ?,. Krey Packing Co.,5 ' the court found a present ex-
47. (1930) 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d) 980.
48. Id. at 984.
49. (1927) 317 Mo. 108, 296 S. W. 157.
50. Id. at 161. See Weed v. American Car and Foundry Co. (1929) 322
Mo. 137, 14 S. W. (2d) 652; Menard v. Goltra (1931) 328 Mo. 368, 40 S. W.
(2d) 1053.
51. 335 Mo. 219, 71 S. W. (2d) 713.
52. Id. at 715.
53. (1927) 317 Mo. 108, 296 S. W. 157.
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was perilous with reference to the truck's being violently started
the truck, because his position (beside truck, hand on hand rail)
was perilous with reference to the truck's being violently started
forward. Yet, the court refused to say, in Ridge v. Jones,14 that
plaintiff's position (beside automobile, hand on door) was equally
perilous with reference to the automobile's being negligently
started. The cases can be distinguished only with difficulty. Both
logic and the "precepts of humanity and natural justice,"' from
the latter of which it has been said that the humanitarian doc-
trine flows, would seem to indicate that drivers of automobiles
should be required equally to avoid skidding into persons stand-
ing beside them as to avoid striking pedestrians who walk or
stand in their paths.56 Later cases indicated that the court has
followed the reasoning of Ridge v. Jones which must be regarded
as a more restrictive interpretation of what constitutes the posi-
tion of peril.57
In restricting the limits of the position of peril the court
directly restricts the operation of the humanitarian doctrine.
Once the defendant's position of peril is ascertained the duty of
plaintiff is such that the defense of contributory negligence no
longer exists. The Missouri doctrine is really a position of peril
doctrine. Recently the Missouri rule has been subjected to
thoughtful questioning. It has been suggested that the entire
doctrine be reappraised with due regard to the conflicting social
interests involved28 The court realizes the strain placed upon
the Missouri rule by modern, fast-moving motor traffic." By
broadly construing the position of peril, the court may be plac-
ing on drivers of automobiles duties which the law should not
require them to assume, duties developed in the days when the
only vehicles that moved at great speed were railroad trains or
street cars.60 In default of a thorough reconsideration, the courts
54. (1934) 335 Mo. 219, 71 S. W. (2d) 713.
55. Banks v. Morris (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482, 484.
56. For a contrary viewpoint see Comment (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rev. 118.
57. See Duckworth v. Dent (Mo. App. 1939) 135 S. W. (2d) 28, rev'd(Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 85, comment (1940) WASHINGTON U. LAWQUARTERLY 482; Roach v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. (Mo. 1940) 141 S. W.
(2d) 800, comment (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rev. 118.
58. McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined(1940) 5 Mo. L. Rev. 56, 88.
59. Crews v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. (1937) 341 Mo. 1090, 111 S. W.
(2d) 54, 57.
60. See id. at 57, 58, where the court said, "Our humanitarian doctrine
holding liable an oblivious operator, who could have seen an oblivious person
approaching the path of his vehicle, was developed in thd days when the
only vehicles that moved at great speed were railroad trains or street cars
running on a track. * * * In other words, in such cases obliviousness could
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may be able by manipulation of the concept of "position of peril,"
to confine the operation of the doctrine within socially desirable
bounds.
ALVIN M. EXTEIN.
RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY AND TRANSFEREE AS AFFECTED
BY ASSIGNMENT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
When the person who contracted for insurance on his own life
assigns the contract to another, the rights of the assignee are
essentially dependent upon and interwoven with the rights of
the beneficiary and of the person who took out the policy. Partly
because of this fact, and partly because the courts have dealt
more fully with problems of change of beneficiary than with
problems of assignment, the first part of this paper will be de-
voted to a consideration of the rights of a beneficiary in the
event of an attempted change of beneficiary. This background
is necessary in order to consider later the effect of an assignment.
In dealing with cases involving life insurance contracts, courts
frequently speak of the "insured." In the case of insurance pro-
cured by a person upon his own life, payable to another, however,
both the applicant and the named beneficiary may be said to be
"insured." For purpose of differentiation, the designation cestui
que vie will be applied to the person upon whose life the policy
is issued. The person to whom the proceeds of the policy are to
be paid will be called the beneficiary. An assignment may be
made in a state other than the place of application for the policy
or the home office of the company, thereby raising problems of
the proper choice of law to govern the transaction. Neither prob-
lems of conflict of laws nor problems of assignment for collateral
security will be considered here.'
The first English life insurance policies apparently contained
no clause reserving the right to change the beneficiary. That
not widen the zone of peril very far. It may not work so well in the case of
2 equally speedy vehicles like automobiles which run anywhere in the street,
with a wide zone of peril because of the speed of many feet (or yards) per
second which obliviousness could widen to more than 100 feet * * * What-
ever may be the ultimate solution for the new strain placed upon the fair
and just operation of our humanitarian doctrine by modern fast-moving
traffic, the question cannot be answered here."
1. Although some of the assignments in cases cited hereafter were made
for purposes of collateral security, those cases are here cited for their
treatment of general assignment problems rather than for their treatment
of other phases of assignment for collateral security.
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